Panel 1: Antitrust and Populism by Fox, Eleanor M. et al.
 1 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE 
 
45th ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 
 
Fordham University School of Law 
Skadden Conference Center, Costantino Room 
150 West 62nd Street, New York, New York 
Thursday, September 6, 2018 — 11:05 a.m. 
 
 
Panel 1 
Antitrust and Populism 
 
Moderator: 
Eleanor M. Fox 
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law 
 
Panelists: 
Herbert Hovenkamp 
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School  
and The Wharton School 
 
Frédéric Jenny 
Chair, OECD Competition Committee; 
Professor, ESSEC Business School 
 
Mario Monti 
President, Bocconi University 
 
Joseph Stiglitz  
Chief Economist, The Roosevelt Institute; 
University Professor, Columbia University 
 
   * * * 
MR. KEYTE: Everybody knows Eleanor Fox, who 
is an iconic figure in antitrust.  This is a fantastic 
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topic and panel that she will lead.  I really look 
forward to it.  
PROF. FOX:  Hello.  Good morning to 
everyone.  Welcome to the panel on Populism and 
Antitrust.  Thank you very much, James.   
For this segment of the program we have a 
most amazing group of speakers, none of whom need 
introduction, but I’ll give a very short one for each 
of them, and then we will talk for just a minute about 
what is the populism problem, if there is one, and 
then turn to our panelists for what will be very short 
initial interventions.  After that, we will have a 
panel discussion, and then we will definitely leave 
time for you to ask your questions or give your 
comments. 
For the panel members I will start with my 
immediate right. 
Herb Hovenkamp is the James G. Diamond 
University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School and the Wharton School at the University of 
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Pennsylvania.  He is often called “the dean of 
American antitrust law.”  He is co-author, with Philip 
Areeda and Donald Turner, of the most famous, well-
regarded U.S. antitrust treatise, Antitrust Law: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their 
Application.  He writes extraordinarily widely in the 
field. 
To his right is Frédéric Jenny.  Frédéric is 
Professor of Economics at ESSEC Business School in 
Paris.  He is what I call “the chairman of 
international antitrust,” meaning in particular he is 
of course the Chairman of the OECD Competition 
Committee.  He was the Chairman of the WTO Working 
Group on Trade and Competition.  He was a member of 
the French Supreme Court, Economic and Commercial 
Chamber, the first and only economist to be a member 
of that court; was Vice Chair of the French 
Competition Authority; and is from time to time my 
colleague at New York University as Global Hauser 
Scholar. 
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To his right is Joseph Stiglitz, who is a 
university professor at Columbia University and a 
Nobel Prize winner in Economic Science.  He was Chief 
Economist of the World Bank, and he was Chairman of 
the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers.  One of his 
very famous books is Globalization and Its 
Discontents, which I think raised the consciousness of 
the world about the discontents of globalization. 
To Joe’s right is Mario Monti.  Mario, we’re 
very happy to welcome you back.  You know Mario at 
least from the time when he was Commissioner at the 
European Commission, first in DG Internal Market and 
then in DG Competition.  He is President of the 
Bocconi University in Milan.  He is a Lifetime Senator 
in Italy.  He was called upon, as Silvio Berlusconi 
was stepping down as Prime Minister of Italy and Italy 
was in great financial crisis and turmoil, to pull 
Italy out of the turmoil; he was Prime Minister of 
Italy. 
That is our wonderful stellar cast. 
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To kick off this session, Joe, I’m going to 
quote from you in your article “America Has a Monopoly 
Problem — and It’s Huge.” 
“There is much to be concerned about in 
America today: a growing political and economic 
divide, slowing growth, decreasing life expectancy, an 
epidemic of diseases of despair.  The unhappiness that 
is apparent has taken an ugly turn, with an increase 
in protectionism and nativism. ... There is a 
widespread sense of powerlessness, both in our 
economic and political life.  We seem no longer to 
control our own destinies.” 
In this article Professor Stiglitz goes on 
to say that the U.S. antitrust laws were based upon a 
concern that “concentrations of economic power 
inevitably would lead to concentrations in political 
power. ... It was really about the nature of our 
society and democracy.” 
This is the subject of our panel today: Is 
there a huge problem that we should be concerned about 
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and do something about — and, of course, since we are 
antitrust people, we are asking the question 
specifically in the context of antitrust; or is the 
populist outcry simply false complaints by people who 
don’t understand that they are helped by trade and 
competition; we should try to teach them the truth, 
but if they can’t understand it is too bad for them?  
That is the question. 
We are going to start out with Frédéric.  
Frédéric, would you say a few words to put this all in 
context?  Is there a problem?  What is the problem?  
How has it emerged?  Of course, you don’t have very 
many minutes for your first intervention, but to the 
extent you wish, is there a solution and what is the 
solution?  We’ll come back to solutions later. 
PROF. JENNY: Thank you very much, Eleanor, 
and thank you very much to Fordham for inviting me to 
be on this panel. 
I would like to address the issue of the 
crumbling consensus on liberal market policies from 
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the point of view of the relationship between policy 
and what I see as economic theory. 
To be technical and not political, I see 
that there are areas where there have been either a 
misuse or an ignorance of economic theory, which may 
explain why it is that we see that more and more 
people both in Europe and in the United States feel 
that the elite is corrupt or pushing policies that are 
for the self-benefit of the elite and not really for 
the benefit of the people, which is one of the 
definitions of what populism is. 
Let me start with a very well-known theorem, 
the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem in international trade, 
which basically says that when a country trades, and 
if they don’t completely specialize, the factor which 
is the scarcer in one country is going to suffer 
because of the competition from the other country and 
because that factor is more abundant in the other 
country.  
Now, what that means is that in the process 
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of globalization there are going to be people who are 
going to be displaced.  When one hears about 
globalization, about trade liberalization, it is very 
seldom that a public policymaker ever mentions the 
fact that in the process there are going to be people 
who are going to lose out. 
If you look at the United States and Europe, 
and if you look at the factors in a rather aggregated 
way, we have comparatively more capital than many 
other countries that we trade with, we have 
comparatively more skilled people than many other 
countries, but we have comparatively fewer unskilled 
people, and they are, according to the theorem, 
precisely the people who are going to be hurt.  Should 
we mention that?  Should we plan when we push the idea 
of free trade, which is certainly a positive in 
general, but should we allow for the fact that some 
people are going to be displaced? 
The basic answer that I find both in trade 
theory and also in competition law is that we don’t 
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need to worry about them because there is a process of 
reallocation of resources.  So, some of the firms are 
going to go out of business but the capital and the 
labor are going to be recycled elsewhere, and because 
you have a very large labor market, people will find 
another job elsewhere. 
This I think is a misuse of economic theory, 
because we in fact know that labor markets are not 
very deep, are not very competitive, and are not very 
flexible.  There are plenty of reasons why, 
particularly for the people who are displaced because 
of competition — I am talking about the low-skill 
workers — are going to have a lot of difficulty 
reallocating themselves in activities that are a 
better fit for the environment. 
Some of those have to do with the fact that 
everybody has a family, there are several people 
working in the family, and it is not all that easy to 
pack up and go where there is another job.  So 
geographical mobility may not be very high.  People 
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own houses, and very often when they are in industries 
that are depleted because of competition the value of 
their houses goes down, the value of lodging in places 
where there are jobs is very high, so that creates a 
second type of problem. 
And in many countries — certainly in Europe 
but from what I’ve read also in the United States — 
the programs to retool people, to give them new 
skills, the skills that could be usable when they 
start from a low level of skills, are not terribly 
effective.  They are not terribly effective, among 
other things, because of the digital revolution and 
the things that we have heard about the evolution of 
technology. 
Therefore, the labor market is in fact very 
fragmented and there is a lot of immobility or lack of 
flexibility, as a result of which the people who are 
going to be directly hit by competition or 
international competition are not going to be able to 
react or to find another job. 
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It’s quite striking to look at the data for 
the United States on people who migrate to find a job.  
There have been statistics since 1999 in the United 
States, and you see that the number of people who 
migrate to find a better job has oscillated between 
2.8 million and 4.5 million, but there is a continuing 
decrease in the trend, even though the U.S. population 
has increased by more than 20 percent during that 
time.  So clearly the lack of flexibility becomes even 
more pronounced now for some of the reasons I have 
mentioned. 
Now, should we ignore that?  What we do when 
we talk about competition is we assume that there is 
not going to be any labor effect of competition, so 
therefore the only effect is going to be — I don’t 
know — lower prices, better quality, so that is going 
to work.  But, in reality, when people are displaced 
at the same time, certainly the system does not 
necessarily work very well for them. 
The third dimension, and the last one, which 
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I want to mention, which I think is important and has 
been consistently ignored in the area of competition, 
in spite of the fact that two eminent economists got 
the Nobel Prize in the last fifteen years for this, is 
the teachings of behavioral economics.  
We work on the assumption that the 
satisfaction, the welfare, of people is directly 
linked to what they can consume or what they choose to 
consume, goods and services. 
If we look at what Daniel Kahneman and 
Richard Thaler tell us, they say basically there is 
another argument in the utility function of people, 
which is some concept of fairness.   
Now, fairness is a big vague; there are 
dimensions of fairness — horizontal fairness, vertical 
fairness, procedural fairness — but it’s quite clear 
that people are willing to trade off some physical 
welfare coming from the goods and services that they 
have for a fairer system, or a system where they have 
the feeling that it is more fair. 
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When you put all those things together, you 
end up with the idea that we have a system where we 
promote competition which would be fine if there was 
no labor implication of competition, but which is not 
fine when there are labor implications because there 
is a large segment of the population for which the 
mechanism will mean that maybe they will have lower 
prices and new products, but also they will either no 
job or a job which is paying much less than they had 
before, and therefore it is not clear to them that 
their welfare has increased.  We don’t talk about it.  
We don’t do much about it. 
I will finish with one thing, which is a 
very interesting set of studies that has been done by 
the Bruegel Research Institute in Europe looking at a 
very disaggregated level at the votes for Trump in the 
United States and for Brexit in the United Kingdom.  
What is absolutely clear is that the correlation 
between the proportion of votes for what I would call, 
in a very rapid and probably simplistic way, some kind 
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of populism is directly linked to (a) the Gini 
coefficient of inequality and (b) poverty, and those 
two themselves are correlated together. 
So, from one place to another it has nothing 
much to do with immigration, a very weak relationship 
with immigration, but a very high relationship with 
inequality. 
We do have a system of competition where 
capital is very mobile, so no problem either 
nationally or internationally to get other 
opportunities.  A segment of the population is hurt by 
it, with no realistic prospect to find a better job or 
to find a job that pays as much even though they work 
as hard, because of policies that have in fact 
implicitly chosen to sacrifice them for other 
benefits. 
If we don’t deal with this issue — and we’ll 
see when we come to the remedies — it means that there 
is a segment of the population that is going to be 
hurt and another segment of the population that thinks 
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that the system is unfair.  I think that’s the heart 
of the problem. 
PROF. FOX:  Great.  Thank you.     
That was a very interesting presentation of 
why people feel that they are left out of the system 
and it doesn’t work for them. 
Joe, could you amplify and give us a larger 
picture on the question: is there an economic problem?  
Does America really have a monopoly problem, what is 
it, and how related to it is competition and 
competition law? 
PROF. STIGLITZ:  First, let me just make a 
couple of brief comments in the beginning. 
I don’t like the word “populism.”  Our 
society is supposed to help ordinary people.  I would 
rather talk about antiestablishment — in the Brexit 
vote, and it was very clear in both the United States 
and in Europe in the Le Pen vote in France. 
The second point is that you said that 
policymakers had misused theory.  I was Chairman of 
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the Council of Economic Advisers.  We pointed out to 
the administration that freeing trade, the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem — every economist knows that — and 
that it would in the best of worlds lead to more 
inequality if markets worked well, and if markets 
didn’t work well it would actually lead to increased 
unemployment. 
It was why many of us said that you can’t 
just take down trade barriers, that you also have to 
accompany that by other policies, trade assistance; 
and that if you didn’t do that, you would be betraying 
the workers of America, making our society not only 
more unequal but actually less efficient, because if 
you were basically throwing out large fractions of the 
labor force out of the labor market, you are actually 
destroying American efficiency. 
I think you have to see what happened in 
terms of the politics of power, that there were some 
groups who benefitted a lot from globalization and 
they didn’t want to share the benefits with those who 
 17 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
were being hurt.  It was a distributive battle in 
which some people won and some people lost.  So it 
wasn’t just lack of knowledge, it was a real battle. 
You see it even worse in the investment 
agreements, which give more property rights to, say, 
American firms investing abroad than they have here in 
the United States in terms of issues of regulatory 
takings.  Therefore, we actually shaped our trade laws 
to weaken the bargaining power of workers. 
The reason all this is relevant is I do 
think we have a monopoly problem.  It’s not only a 
monopoly problem; it’s a problem of imbalance of 
market power.   
The competitive model that has sort of 
framed a lot of thinking about antitrust is now pretty 
discredited in economics, and anybody who relies on 
that is really using a model that just doesn’t 
describe a 20 percent economy.  Lots of evidence of 
this in terms of the distribution of income cannot be 
explained within a competitive model.  The share of 
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what are called rents that can’t be explained by 
either return to labor or return to capital has gone 
way up.  While there is some dispute about this, I 
think there is a broad consensus that there has been a 
significant increase in rents. 
The explanation for it is somewhat — to what 
extent is it technology, market structure, 
anticompetitive practices, lack of enforcement of 
antitrust laws, innovation in creating new 
anticompetitive practices — Microsoft we talked about 
in the first session and Google, but there are other 
companies that are at the frontier of innovating and 
developing new anticompetitive practices. 
The way to understand what is going on is to 
see that the competitive model which has been the 
framework for antitrust is really not a good way of 
understanding the economy. 
What is particularly important is what 
Frédéric emphasized, the lack of competition in labor 
markets.  If you talk to labor economists and you talk 
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about competitive markets, they laugh at you.  The 
work of, for instance, David Card and Alan Krueger 
about what would happen if you raised the minimum wage 
— standard theory says it should have large effects on 
unemployment; it doesn’t.  But there are lots of other 
studies that have now been done that make it very 
clear that labor markets are not well-described. 
Let me put it more broadly.  Markets don’t 
exist in a vacuum; they are shaped by our laws.  Our 
laws on competition shape product markets.  Our labor 
laws shape what goes on in labor markets.  There has 
been a change in the nature of those laws which has 
disempowered workers, in particular vis-à-vis 
corporations.   
As a result, you have these two effects 
going on at the same time: weakening market power of 
workers, partly because of trade policy but also 
because of changes in the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) regulations and so forth, and a recent 
Supreme Court decision; and, on the other hand, an 
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increase in market power for a whole variety of 
reasons. 
All of this relates to what Eleanor said in 
the beginning.  If we could go back to the origins of 
antitrust, it didn’t have to do with economists 
worrying about distortions in a competitive 
equilibrium model.  That was not what Teddy Roosevelt 
was talking about.  The model wasn’t even formulated 
at that point.  It wasn’t fine-tuning to make sure a 
competitive market really worked better; it was about 
political and economic power and the effect economic 
power was having on our political system. 
I think that we are at a similar juncture 
today: a sense that there is inequality, that many of 
the reasons for this inequality have to do with the 
way the rules have been formulated; the way the rules 
have been formulated has to do with our political 
system; the political system is affected by money; and 
money is affected by monopoly power on the one hand 
and lack of effective power on the part of workers. 
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Once you see it this way, you begin to 
understand why the standard arguments — just focusing 
on, for instance, consumer welfare — do not have 
purchase.  So, for instance, if a worker has no job, 
the fact that goods are a little cheaper doesn’t make 
him feel very good.  He has no purchasing power, so a 
little cheaper doesn’t make any difference.  That’s in 
the context of trade theory. 
But if the exercise of monopsony power leads 
to lower wages in the labor market and that is passed 
on partly to consumers, it’s still not a good thing.  
It’s a distortion in our economy.  The fact is that 
the consumer has been a little bit better off but the 
bulk of the benefits went to the corporation is a sign 
that something is wrong. 
Some of our big companies have clearly 
market power, and the fact that they can share that 
with their customers isn’t a statement that the system 
is functioning well.  In some areas, like finance and 
banking, large banks have a further advantage because 
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of the implicit guarantee of “too big to fail,” and so 
you can get large not because you are more efficient, 
but because you are taking advantage of these other 
things, like “too big to fail,” monopsony power.   
So the usual concern: We are not against 
size, but we are against size when it arises from 
abuse, anticompetitive practices on the one hand and 
the use of market power on the other. 
Now, let me just talk about the 
pervasiveness of market power is actually having many 
of us believe macroeconomic effects.  One of the 
startling things about the U.S. economy today — and to 
a lesser extent in Europe — is that profits are 
reaching as a share of GDP an all-time high, and yet 
investment is not.   
Normally, in a normal model, you would have 
thought “If things are so profitable, why aren’t they 
investing?”  The simple answer: If there is lack of 
competition, there is a discrepancy between the 
marginal return on investment and the average return; 
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and the more market power, the greater that 
discrepancy is.  Thus, you can have high profits and 
yet low marginal returns and low investments, and 
there is an increasing understanding that this may be 
one of the reasons for the weaknesses in our overall 
growth performance. 
I want to make very briefly two more points. 
When you recognize the pervasiveness of 
market power, it also affects a variety of other ways 
in which you look at issues of competition policy.  
Traditionally, there has been a lot of focus mostly on 
horizontal mergers.  In the presence of lots of 
pockets of imperfect competition, vertical mergers can 
also have severe anticompetitive effects.  In some 
sense, in a general equilibrium model you may not even 
need to distinguish between horizontal and vertical; 
those are just ways of organizing what is going on.  
But a merger can increase market power, and that 
should be really the test that you want to apply. 
The second point I want to make, a final 
 24 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
point, is that there has been a lot of innovation in 
exercise of market power and there have been changes 
in the structure of our economy, and in both areas I’m 
not sure that antitrust has kept up with what needs to 
be done.  On one hand, the issues raised by artificial 
intelligence and access to big data and the use of 
data seems to me an issue that will be important going 
forward.   
The second one is the two-sided markets.  I 
gather you had a discussion yesterday of some of the 
two-sided market issues.  It is clear in my view that 
the Supreme Court got it wrong.  Whether in those 
particular cases there was a two-sided market, how you 
think about two-sided markets is clearly more complex 
than the Supreme Court understood.  The contract 
provisions, which short-circuit use of the price 
system, is an example of what I think of as an 
anticompetitive practice which takes what would be a 
market power that arises out of network externalities 
and amplifies the consequences of it.   
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So that as we have, as was discussed in the 
previous session, network externalities, some 
technological changes, we have to be even more 
cautious about the innovation in anticompetitive 
practices that we have been seeing. 
PROF. FOX:  Thank you.  That was provocative 
on so many points, and we’ll pick up on your 
provocations at the panel discussion. 
At this moment we’re going to turn to Mario 
Monti.  Mario, could you say some words about both 
political populism, especially as related to Europe, 
and its relationship to markets and competition?  
PROF. MONTI:  I’ll try. 
The curious aspect to that is that populism 
and competition policy have a semantic but also 
substantial point in common — that is, trust.  Here we 
are dealing with a triangle which has populism 
generating and linked to a huge mistrust in society 
and in institutions. 
Competition policy is of course to a large 
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extent antitrust, and our problem is: can antitrust 
help in turning back into trust a situation of 
mistrust which plagues our economies and societies 
now? 
Looking at this particularly from the 
perspective of Europe, I would wish to say first of 
all that the Europe Union is in my view more 
vulnerable than other countries or jurisdictions to 
populism.   
Why?  Because populism has common aspects 
wherever it manifests itself, but when it manifests 
itself in an integrated system of countries, then 
populism can be a powerful factor for disintegration 
because populism generates, and is in turn generated 
by, mistrust in politics, in political institutions, 
in the elites, and the narrowing of the horizon of 
national political decision-making that goes with 
populism.   
That is, a shorter and shorter time horizon 
and narrower and narrower geographical scope of 
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decision-making in politics when populism prevails has 
the consequence that the first victim of populism is 
integration, is international integration generally.  
We can see that in the last few years both at the 
global level within the WTO, in individual countries, 
but above all in an articulated system of countries 
like the European Union. 
In Europe, of course, competition policy 
(antitrust) was historically brought about by European 
integration, exactly the reverse of what we have seen 
more recently concerning monetary policy.  There we 
had national central banks in Europe, and then much 
more recently the emergence of a system comprised 
centrally of the European Central Bank and of the 
national central banks. 
If we go back to the history of competition 
policy in Europe, we see competition born in 1958 in 
Germany and in the European Union, whereas there were 
no competition laws or competition authorities in any 
other country in Europe.  That was very much under 
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American influence, by the way, the creation in 
Germany and in the European Union of competition 
policy and laws.  
To the extent that the advent of populism 
may weaken the progress of European integration, may 
bring some aspects of disintegration, this may weaken 
the vector of competition policy into the European 
system as a whole.  
Populism in its extreme forms in Europe may 
even lead to the bringing down of the European Union.  
I do not believe that populism in the United States, 
for the time being at least, is susceptible of 
bringing down — maybe some actions by the American 
President may contribute to some U.S. disintegration, 
so far more forcefully than he has contributed to the 
declared objective of favoring European 
disintegration.  At any rate, a weakening of the 
European Union in Europe would mean a weakening of 
competition policy, whereas populism can hardly bring 
about this in the United States.  
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Now, it is amazing how late, how slow, the 
political system in Europe has been in recognizing the 
phenomenon of populism, which is now a number-one 
phenomenon.  If you ask somebody about what is the 
main concern about the elections for the European 
Parliament next May, most European governments will 
tell you that is populism. 
But I want to give you simply an anecdote 
that tells us how blind Europe’s politicians were to 
the emergence of populism.  That has been visible for 
ten years already. 
In 2012, in my brief time as Prime Minister 
of Italy, and therefore a participant in the European 
Council where the heads of government sit, I was 
impressed by the total lack of any political 
discussion on Europe.  All the time went to the Greek 
crisis and similar topics, nothing to the first signs, 
which were very visible already, of populism and what 
implications that may have for the process of European 
integration. 
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I proposed to the President of the European 
Council, Herman Van Rompuy, to hold one specific 
session of that Council for a political discussion on 
this emerging populism and nationalism.  He said, 
“What a great idea.  We will do that.” 
Two days later, one of the most forward-
looking European politicians, Chancellor Merkel, 
kindly called me and she said, “Herman told me of your 
idea of having a discussion on populism.  I think it’s 
a good idea, but I think it would be more appropriate 
if we delay this discussion until the complete 
solution of the Greek crisis is achieved.”  
They haven’t had this discussion yet, 
although populism — 
PROF. STIGLITZ:  Or the crisis isn’t 
resolved. 
PROF. MONTI:  No. 
Well, this says something about European 
governance, but also about the delay in perception.  
If you are inside, then you should be more interested 
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than ever about this phenomenon. 
My last but one point I would like to make 
is about inequalities.  We all know that populism has 
been fed largely by inequalities.  And here in the 
case of the European Union the process of European 
integration has been biased, we must recognize, 
because the strong weapons in the hands of the 
integrator — i.e. the European Commission — have been 
the policies on the Single Market and the policies on 
competition, whereas policies which could have 
accompanied integration with actions to take care of 
the temporary losers from integration remain largely 
in national hands, fiscal policy in particular.  It is 
a valid criticism that the process of market 
integration in Europe has brought about greater 
inequalities in favor of capital and companies and 
against labor, particularly the non-qualified labor. 
But it is interesting to note that although 
it is extremely difficult to make progress in tax 
coordination — because of the unanimity requirement in 
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the Council, all Member States have a veto — and tax 
coordination is needed if we want that market 
integration does not bring about this negative side 
effect of bias in the distributional income against 
labor. 
Nevertheless, there is one exception of an 
area that we can call taxation, which is comprised in 
the European definition of competition policy.  You 
know that the main difference between the European 
Union and the rest of the world is that in the 
European Union, because of its supranational nature, 
competition policy comprises also state aid control.  
One of the feeders of populism is the perception — 
real or not real — that the rich, the big, have a 
greater easiness in evading and eluding taxes.   
The European Commission has gradually built 
a doctrine, which has been upheld by the European 
Court, that some state aids taking the form of tax 
privileges incur into the rules on state aids.  
Therefore, a major case, like the case two years ago 
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of the European Commission asking the Irish government 
to ask back of Apple some €13 billion euros of tax 
advantages may help a lot tackle one of the issues 
which are the basis of populism.  Here I think there 
is a potential for the European Commission to act even 
more. 
Last, a quick point on the digital 
platforms.  We all look with enormous interest — and 
this morning in the previous presentations that was an 
important part — to the application of competition 
policy and antitrust to big tech and the digital 
platforms. 
For a number of reasons, the European 
competition policy being rather more solid, certainly 
less politically cyclical, than competition policy is 
in the United States, can be expected — and maybe is 
already — to display greater incisiveness in this new 
area as well. 
Here there are two sentences in one of the 
recent speeches by George Soros.  He applauds the 
 34 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
actions of Commissioner Vestager in this area.  He 
says: “In the US, the regulators are not strong enough 
to stand up against [the big tech companies’] 
political influence.  The European Union is better 
situated because it doesn’t have any platform giants 
of its own.” 1 
In this asymmetry I see a very central point 
of concern for the next few years.  We know that — 
even more generally, look at the Data Protection 
Regulation — the European Union becomes more and more 
specialized in regulation.  Unfortunately for Europe, 
it is not equally strong in developing within Europe 
digital platforms.  But if the European Union is to 
conduct its competition enforcement vigorously, it 
will statistically hit much more than proportionately 
companies that are based in the United States.  We 
here all know that there is no industrial policy, no 
protectionist, tilt to that, but it will should be 
watched very, very carefully.   
                                                 
1 George Soros, “The Current Moment in History,” Remarks Before the World Economic Forum, 
Davos, Switzerland (Jan. 25, 2018), available at 
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In the limit, suppose that measures to cope 
with the excessive market power of these digital 
platforms may require breakups.  Can we imagine the 
European competition authority has permission to make 
such a decision concerning a U.S.-based digital 
platform?  I think this would pose very interesting 
problems. 
We saw what could be called a virtual 
breakup, namely the non-authorization of a merger that 
had been already authorized in the United States, 
GE/Honeywell, creating remarkable shocks.  I think it 
will be politically extremely problematic to have 
structural remedies in this industry unless a new, 
very high consensus is developed, first of all, in 
this family about how to proceed about that without 
any suspicion of protectionist or industrial policy 
elements. 
PROF. FOX:  Thank you, Mario, for those very 
provocative remarks. 
                                                                                                                                     
https://www.georgesoros.com/2018/01/25/remarks-delivered-at-the-world-economic-forum/ 
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As you will have observed, we are taking on 
two elements that may seem disparate.  One is 
political populism. Extreme political parties have 
been winning elections all over the world. They may 
take nativist political positions and their systems 
may lack due process and lack rule of law. They are 
fueled by sentiments that underlie antitrust populism 
– discontent with growing inequalities, a feeling of 
being left out, believing that the system works for 
elites and not for the people. 
Herb, I am going to ask you to take us back 
to a narrower internal-to-competition debate.  How 
does populism — or, as Joe says, anti-elitism, anti-
establishmentism — how does that play into competition 
law?  The panel has raised real concerns. But do they 
relate to competition law and should we bring them 
into competition law? 
PROF. HOVENKAMP:  Thank you. 
I’m here as an American antitrust moderate, 
and so far the populists haven’t pushed me off that 
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point, and that’s the perspective I’ll speak from. 
I believe in the consumer welfare principle.  
I believe it needs some tinkering, but I’m not 
deterred that it was a bad idea. 
First of all, I think one of the things we 
need to hope for at this point is a soft landing.  
Populism comes and goes.  I think it is practically 
unquestionable that there are going to be effects of 
this populist movement and that the problems that the 
other panel members have identified are very real.  I 
think the worst thing antitrust can do is stick its 
head in the sand, like the proverbial ostrich, and 
pretend like they are not there. 
Now, we had one experience which did 
produce, I believe, a soft landing, and that was the 
transition from the Sherman Act in 1890 to the Clayton 
Act in 1914.  The Sherman Act was very much a 
populist-driven measure.  It was quite agrarian, 
fairly rural, and quite anti-intellectual.   
However, over the next twenty-five years the 
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rise of progressivism became more urban, more 
educated, and the result of course was not 
nationalization of the railroads, as some people in 
the Gilded Age proposed, or some other form of 
socialism.   
Rather, it was a set of provisions that were 
more explicit about what they covered.  They continued 
to use economic language “where the effect may be 
substantially to lessen competition or create a 
monopoly.”  They created an effects test in all of the 
substantive provisions of the Clayton Act that more or 
less invited economic analysis in.   
Antitrust took a somewhat more aggressive 
turn in the wake of the Clayton Act, as it should 
have, but it didn’t throw American’s mixed capitalist 
economy off the rails.  I think that’s a worthwhile 
thing to keep in mind.  
The other thing to keep in mind is that 
among the various economic problems we have been 
talking about this morning antitrust is not by any 
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means the only fix.  Yes, wages are too low, wages are 
stagnating, there’s a growing maldistribution of 
wealth in the country.  Those are all problems that 
need to be addressed.   
But antitrust is not the exclusive, nor even 
the predominant, tool for doing many of those things.  
And here, particularly in the case of U.S. antitrust 
law, we have a set of provisions that are enforced 
very heavily by private plaintiffs, and if damages are 
being sought, as they usually are, it means jury 
trials.  As a result, we always have to keep a bit of 
a restraint on policymaking through the antitrust laws 
because it’s so easy to lose control of where 
antitrust can go. 
Now, what are the changes I think we need to 
make? 
First and foremost, I think we need to 
change our basic presumption about efficiencies.  
Robert Bork believed that efficiencies were incapable 
of individualized proof, but he simply presumed that 
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the vast majority of actions challenged as 
anticompetitive, other than naked cartels, were in 
fact motivated by efficiencies. 
Well, our measurement tools are much better 
today, particularly thanks to decades of merger 
enforcement.  I think that presumption needs to be 
weakened very considerably, and that means a couple of 
things.  That means that we need lower standards for 
prima facie cases, particularly with respect to 
exclusionary practices and mergers.  And then, if 
efficiencies are required — that is, if a prima facie 
case has been met — then we really do have to put 
teeth into the requirement that efficiencies be 
proven.   
I think the error of Ohio v. American 
Express was that the Court was way too lenient with 
respect to making out a prima facie case, because I 
suspect that if the burden had ever shifted, AMEX 
would not have been able to document the efficiencies 
that it was claiming.  
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Secondly, we need to take the labor problem 
a whole lot more seriously.  I think everybody on the 
panel has acknowledge it in some form.  Wage growth 
has not kept up.  There are fixes we could be making. 
First of all, I think the consumer welfare 
principle needs to be rethought of more as affecting 
output rather than price; that is, the goal of the 
antitrust laws should be maximum output consistent 
with sustainable competition, and that should serve to 
squeeze down the margins between prices and costs.  It 
also solves the problem that of course laborers as 
sellers of labor are not really consumers, but they 
are certainly under the umbrella of groups that we 
want to protect under the consumer welfare principle. 
More specifically, are there things we can 
do with respect to labor?  Yeah.  One of them is to go 
more aggressively against mergers that have a negative 
impact in labor markets.  Mr. Delrahim has already 
suggested that possibility.  It has been bandied about 
quite a bit.   
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I have had quite an education myself in the 
last ten years about both the size and the mobility of 
laborers and labor markets.  Concentration in labor 
markets is higher, with higher concentration in many 
product markets, and as a result we should be using 
antitrust more aggressively to go after mergers that 
tend to reduce the opportunities of labor and in the 
process suppress wages to infracompetitive levels. 
That, by the way, means that we will go 
after certain mergers that don’t look horizontal 
because we’re so fixated on product markets.  For 
example, just about a year ago, the California State 
Attorney General got a consent decree against a no-
poaching agreement between eBay and Intuit.   
Well, eBay and Intuit don’t compete in any 
product markets to speak of, other than eBay selling 
an occasional copy of TurboTax or something.  But they 
agreed with each other not to hire or poach one 
another’s computer engineers. 
Well, we think of a relevant market as a 
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collusive group.  What that tells me is that when we 
start looking at mergers we need to spend some time in 
addition looking and asking the question whether a 
merger is horizontal.  We want to know not only where 
and what products the company sells; we also want to 
know what kinds of people it hires.  We need to be 
more conscious of that.   
The other area is noncompetition agreements.  
We have always had this high theory about employee 
noncompetition agreements.  They are used to protect 
trade secrets, customer lists, and things like that. 
Two recent refusals-to-dismiss complaints — 
I think one was a summary judgment — were against 
Jimmy John’s and McDonald’s.  The Jimmy John’s one 
made kind of a feeble attempt to say “Well, there were 
some trade secrets here because our employees cut the 
head lettuce in a certain way” or something.   
But the fact is these were global with 
respect to those firms’ anti-noncompete agreements 
that effectively forbade the franchisers of those 
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companies to hire one another’s employees.  Of course, 
the result would be lack of employee mobility and 
reduced wages.  I think that’s another area where we 
could get much more serious.  
Finally, we need to deal with the 
concentration problem, although I would add an 
important caveat that most of the people at Open 
Markets, for example, have not added.  That is, we 
need to continue to try to establish links between 
concentration and performance.  That is, we don’t go 
after concentration for its own sake; we go after 
concentration when it results in lower output, higher 
prices, or some other effect that we can brand as 
noncompetitive.  That may mean that in certain cases 
we do allow fairly large firms, but we do need to take 
the concentration problem more seriously. 
I think the worst thing antitrust policy can 
do today is just stick its head in the sand and say, 
“We’re going to ignore these problems.”  I think some 
compromise and working out will give us the kind of 
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soft landing that the Clayton Act gave us a century 
ago. 
PROF. FOX:  Thank you all. 
There is a certain amount of consensus on 
the panel. There are losers from competition that 
aren’t taken well care of within competition law or 
even society as a whole.  Another theme of the panel 
has been that our competition law in the United States 
is based on premises about market power and 
efficiencies that may not be true. 
I want to do two things right now.  First of 
all, I want to ask the panel: are there solutions you 
want to propose that you have not yet proposed?   
Then, second of all, are the proposed 
solutions likely to satisfy the people who identify as 
populists, or are the solutions marginal; working 
within the system and just making our competition law 
a little better? Will that satisfy the people who say, 
“We’re really left out; the markets aren’t working for 
us?” 
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Frédéric, maybe you can go first on any 
proposed solutions that haven’t been mentioned yet. 
PROF. JENNY:  Yes. 
First of all, I completely agree with what 
Herb said.  I think that there are two things to 
avoid.  The first one is to ignore the problem 
completely.   
The second one I would say is to jump to the 
conclusion that the antitrust standard has to be 
changed, that fairness has to be included in it.  The 
reason for this is that I think that the populist or 
the antiestablishment perspective is not so much to be 
against the principle of competition, but more against 
the fact that the way it has developed it is seen as 
unfair.  That is what we have to fix.  It’s not so 
much the theory; it’s more the practice of it. 
On what Joe Stiglitz said — concentration, 
common ownership, increasing margins, etc., etc. — I 
think we have to be a bit careful.  There is a lot of 
interesting work which is being done.  Whether that 
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can be translated into a rule of law — at this point 
it’s a bit premature.  There is quite a bit of 
controversy on, as you mentioned, whether the margins 
are very high or increasing because there is more 
technological innovation or because there’s more naked 
abuse of market power.  It is still not very clear.  
So I would be cautious there. 
But it seems to me that competition 
authorities, if they want to regain the trust of 
people and stop meeting with each other all the time 
everywhere to reassure each other — this is what they 
do, and I participate in this — I’m absolutely struck 
by the fact that they have a very limited notion of 
the scope of the advocacy that they give. 
It is quite clear that if there is anything 
that will make competition work better for consumers 
but is not directly the implementation of competition 
law — such as, for example, increasing the mobility of 
people by having a more-efficient educational system 
that will give better skills to people, or having a 
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system that will allow people to not lose all their 
investment when they have to move from one region 
which is depressed to another, etc., etc. 
I don’t see that competition authorities 
address in their advocacy function a number of things 
that might make competition much more acceptable.  I 
think that we have the duty, or we should have the 
duty, to expand the scope of our advocacy.  
The second thing — but Herb has talked about 
it so I am not going to go through it — is to give 
more attention to the labor implication of mergers or 
others. 
From that point of view — I will come back 
to it in a second — it is clear that South Africa is 
an interesting experience.  For some mergers — if you 
think about the Walmart/Massmart merger, for example, 
in South Africa — one of the ideas which prevailed was 
the fact that “Well, there are a lot of people who 
might be displaced.  I am going to put conditions 
which are going to facilitate the transition (a) by 
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the creation of a fund, (b) by having Walmart commit 
to securing from the local producer for a while before 
they change.”  I am not discussing the wisdom of this.  
But the spirit of it is to say, “Okay, competition in 
this case will mean that there is going to be a labor 
problem, but maybe there are remedies that I can think 
of that are going to make this labor remedy more 
acceptable.” 
The third one — I’m sorry to come back to 
this because it fell on deaf ears — reading the 
literature of behavioral economists is extremely 
interesting on the area of fairness.  In particular, 
when you read the work of Kahneman and Thaler, you see 
that through experiments they are able to get to the 
kind of fairness that people have in mind.   
You find that one could use this — 
competition authorities could use this — to pick among 
all the possible anticompetitive practices or 
transactions that they have in front of them those 
that appeal more to the sense of fairness of people.  
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If we are going to have prioritization, in any case we 
have to find criteria for picking the cases which are 
both anticompetitive, without changing the standard, 
but which also seem to be particularly unfair. 
I’ll give you just one example.  One of the 
interesting things that comes out of this work is the 
fact that people in general, the vast majority, find 
that an increase in price by suppliers following an 
increase in their own cost is not necessarily unfair, 
but an increase in price which is not justified by an 
increase in cost is mostly seen as being unfair.  
Okay. 
What does that tell us?  Well, if we have 
two cases, a case of a cartel to pass on an increase 
in the price of gas or something and another cartel 
which is a naked cartel to increase prices, between 
the two one of them is going to be perceived as 
“really unfair and it’s good that the competition 
authority went after it,” and the other one as “maybe 
it was anticompetitive, but it’s not so valuable from 
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the point of view of fairness.” 
This is one tiny example, but there are a 
number of practical implications of the concept of 
fairness that people have in mind.  Without changing 
the metrics but by using prioritization principles to 
make competition work for consumers, or to make 
competition seem to work, one can choose first the 
cases that are most problematic. 
From that point of view, I would say that 
the European Commission does that.  Mario has already 
mentioned the Apple case.  One thing about the 
increase in price of medicine by hundreds of times, 
this is typically the case where you have a naked 
increase in price that doesn’t seem to be justified by 
any cost consideration, and which seems to be 
particularly unfair.  The treatment of Mr. Shkreli in 
the United States shows that clearly people thought 
that he was being unfair. 
There is value in choosing the 
anticompetitive practices which are unfair. 
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PROF. FOX:  Thank you.  Provocative again.  
Time is running short, so I want to ask Joe 
a short question and then turn to the audience.   
Joe, you gave us some very specific 
practical ways that antitrust law could, let’s say, be 
rejiggered.  But your big point was huge, to really 
move the envelope in a big way for reconceiving what 
is market power. Is that possible? Or is it just a 
fanciful idea given where we are? 
PROF. STIGLITZ:  Yes, I think it is 
possible, although I don’t think one should 
necessarily keep away from aspirational ideas either.  
But I think it actually is practical. 
If you go back to the kind of idea that’s in 
the Merger Guidelines, the power to raise price — can 
you raise the price over marginal cost — and you ask 
any change in merger acquisition, whether it’s 
vertical or horizontal, you could ask — it may be hard 
to answer but you could ask — does it affect the power 
to raise price?   
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To conclude, I really like what Herb said: 
it’s not only the power to raise prices, but the power 
to depress wages.  It’s market power in any of its 
dimensions.  It’s the power to impose a contract 
provision that would not be in the individual’s 
rational interest to accept other than as a result of 
market power. 
So, I think it is an idea that can be 
implemented.   
This goes back to a remark that was made.  
We’ve always used market share as an indirect 
indicator of whether there is that market power.  But 
now we often have the case where we can actually 
ascertain whether there is market power and we 
shouldn’t necessarily have to filter this through the 
lens of market share. 
I want to make one other point very briefly, 
which is much of the analysis in economics in 
antitrust is very static in nature and is not dynamic, 
and yet society is really concerned with the long run.  
 54 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
You see these concerns arise in fairness and they 
question whether the competition authorities are 
promoting competition. 
If Walmart had come into South Africa 
without the compensatory measures that they took, 
there would have been less competition.  At least 
South African producers would have been driven out of 
business, they would have been able to buy the goods 
from China using their monopsony power, and an 
ordinary person looking at this would ask, “How is 
this promoting competition when it is driving out 
South African producers?” 
The same thing.  There is an increasing 
concern, I think, about preemptive mergers in the tech 
field.  They look at the conditions today and they 
say, “Well, this little pipsqueak today is not really 
changing market share as it is today.”  But if every 
time somebody who has the potential to come up is 
bought in a preemptive merger by Google or one of the 
other tech giants, there never will be competition.  
 55 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
I think we have to think more explicitly 
about the dynamics.  That, of course, was what 
Microsoft was trying to head off in some of its 
measures.  But there are new techniques now for trying 
to avoid competition in the future. 
PROF. FOX:  Let’s turn to the audience and 
see what questions and comments you have.  Who would 
like to be the first to intervene? 
QUESTION:  Maxime Fischer-Zernin from Axinn, 
Veltrop & Harkrider. 
I have a question for Professor Hovenkamp.  
You talked about shifting the consumer welfare 
standard from price to output.  I was wondering how 
you would define the welfare standard as it is used 
today in the courts and what do you think would be the 
effects of that shift towards output and whether it 
can be done in the current framework? 
PROF. HOVENKAMP:  First of all, the modern 
consumer welfare standard as we use it today looks 
only at the welfare of consumers, not of producers.  
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That’s the difference between the current version and 
Bork’s version forty years ago. 
Focusing on output rather than price is kind 
of a rhetorical issue because when output goes up 
price goes down.  But it meets this objection that you 
so often hear from the Neo-Brandeisians, that a 
consumer welfare standard doesn’t protect labor 
because laborers aren’t consumers; as laborers they’re 
sellers.   
If you think of the consumer welfare 
standard in terms of output, you want markets that are 
competitive on both the buying side and the seller 
side so that every unit of either labor or product is 
being sold for its marginal productive value.  I think 
that gets you closer to an articulable goal. 
Now, I’m not saying it’s going to be always 
that easy to apply, but at least we want markets that 
are competitive on the labor side as well as the 
product side. 
PROF. FOX:  Would that do it, Joe? 
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PROF. STIGLITZ:  First of all, output has to 
be properly defined.  So, for instance, if you have a 
set of arrangements that allow effectively a tax on 
cash transactions to subsidize credit card 
transactions and you narrowly define output as credit 
card transactions, credit card sales could go up, but 
it’s not the total number of transactions that has 
gone up, and you have distorted the market in a very 
important way. 
One of the problems in some recent decisions 
is that they have looked at output in the wrong way.  
There are broader what we would call general 
equilibrium effects where, for instance, if you drive 
down wages from monopoly power and the result of that 
is that people work harder and as a result of that 
output goes up, that’s not a good thing. 
So, output needs to be understood in terms 
of a very broad welfare construct. 
PROF. FOX:  Panelists, would you confine any 
changes to price or output. What about labor? Do your 
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solutions take in the big concerns of the losers?  Is 
antitrust more than price and output? 
PROF. STIGLITZ:  I think you have to look at 
how the overall economic system works.  Now, this goes 
to what you might say is the difference between when I 
said aspirational and actually implementable. 
I think that it ought to be of concern that 
if you had an economic arrangement the losers of which 
are poor people, then I think that’s a consideration 
that one ought to take into account. 
PROF. FOX:  And that’s distributional to 
poor people? 
PROF. STIGLITZ:  That’s right.  It 
reinforces — I don’t want to say it’s the only thing, 
but I think it should be a factor that tilts the 
balance in how you are looking at how this competitive 
system is working.  Because it’s not a competitive 
system.  We are changing the balance as bargaining 
powers, and when the outcome of this is not only lower 
output but also more inequity, I think we should be 
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more compelled to take action. 
PROF. FOX:  I’m going to call on Mario now, 
but if anyone wants to make a comment or ask a 
question, just go up to the microphone.  We’ll have 
time for one more, maybe two more. 
Mario, go ahead. 
PROF. MONTI:  We heard a number of ways in 
which competition policy could address populist 
concerns.  I have a question for the rest of the 
panel.  To me, Fordham, which I first attended in the 
year 2000, has been and is the symbol of convergence. 
Are we perhaps heading to a situation where 
there will be some conflict between two worthwhile 
objectives (1) addressing concerns raised by populists 
and (2) international convergence, further convergence 
in competition policy?   
Some of the solutions we heard seemed to be 
rather country-specific, social system-specific, 
structure-specific.  Much of the progress in 
convergence over the last twenty years was achieved as 
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we moved — and certainly from the European side we had 
to move quite a bit — towards a more abstract and 
general principle, that of consumer welfare.   
So, are we going to have to make a choice 
between a more populist, resilient competition policy 
and a more globally coordinated competition policy? 
PROF. FOX:  Great question. Are there 
tradeoffs; how big are the tradeoffs? 
Before your answers, let’s take the last 
question from the floor. Then I want to give each of 
you only one minute to say what you wish.  It can be 
in response to Mario’s question, the new question, 
whatever.  We only have four more minutes. 
QUESTION:  My name is Michael Cragg.  I’m 
Chairman of The Brattle Group. 
I’m curious what the panel’s view is in 
terms of U.S. competition policy whether the Supreme 
Court’s decision in AMEX, which emphasized indirect 
network effects and the economics of platforms, 
provides sufficient impetus to examine the dynamic 
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effects that Professor Stiglitz spoke to and whether 
it addresses the new economy in a way that allows for 
regulation or abuses; or does Congress have to take 
action to provide more guidance as to how we think 
about the digital economy? 
PROF. FOX:  Thank you. 
Herb, let’s start with you and go down the 
line. 
PROF. HOVENKAMP:  On AMEX or on anything? 
PROF. FOX:  On AMEX or anything.   
PROF. HOVENKAMP:  One sentence on each. 
First of all, I am very frustrated when I 
read things like Barry Lynn of Open Markets — I agree 
with him that there are many, many economic problems 
in the country regarding distribution of wealth, the 
plight of laborers, and so on — but very little 
recognition that antitrust has any institutional 
limits.  He seems to believe we can use antitrust to 
kind of rewrite the economy without having any more 
explicit judgment. 
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AMEX is such an economic nightmare that I 
don’t think it is going to be a useful guide for 
anything, although I do fear it is going to cost 
thousands of hours of litigation deciding when to put 
both sides of a platform into the same market.  So, I 
hesitate to predict so much. 
My guess is that AMEX is going to go the way 
of Image Tech v. Kodak, if you all are familiar with 
that decision, which is that the courts bent over 
backwards in the subsequent ten years to construe it 
as narrowly as possible in order to limit the amount 
of damage that it could do.  The result was that Image 
Tech never had all that much traction in the antitrust 
courts.  I hope and pray that that ends up being the 
case with AMEX as well. 
PROF. FOX:  Frédéric? 
PROF. JENNY:  First of all, I’m extremely 
happy that I don’t think that anybody on the panel 
said we should just ignore the problem as we have done 
in the past.  Everybody said, “Well, the 
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distributional impact of competition may have some 
importance.” 
In answer to Mario, I would say that among 
the things I suggested there are some that don’t 
create the possibility of a conflict.  If it’s a 
question of advocacy for the competition authority or 
the way it prioritizes cases, that’s entirely its 
freedom, and it doesn’t necessarily raise an issue. 
Once one gets into taking into account the 
labor implication of a merger, there is more risk 
there.  But I think that the important step is to say, 
“Well, maybe we’re not quite ready to go there at this 
point.” 
First of all, the experience of South Africa 
has shown that at the time there was a lot of anxiety 
over the Walmart case, but ex post everybody seems to 
say it was a pretty good idea.  So, time will help us 
solve those problems. 
I think where we would really have a problem 
— and is kind of the thing which is agitated by some — 
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is to say, “Let’s include fairness as one of the 
criteria of anticompetitive practices.”  I think that 
we are nowhere near that and that we stay away from 
this, but this doesn’t mean ignoring the problem. 
PROF. FOX:  Thank you. 
Joe? 
PROF. STIGLITZ:  First, on the Supreme 
Court, I think it illustrates that economics is more 
complicated than a lot of people understand and giving 
what was a very difficult economic case to a 
particular jurist may not have been a good idea. 
The economics literature actually has only 
addressed how two-sided markets work in the presence 
of monopoly.  It actually hasn’t really addressed 
competition in two-sided markets.  So, they didn’t 
really have a lot to draw upon, but what they had to 
draw upon they clearly got totally wrong. 
The underlying economics — it’s sort of like 
some legislatures in the United States have legislated 
that pi should be 3.0 because it’s too complicated to 
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remember that it’s 3.1416.  Well, if you make law like 
that, you’re going to have trouble squaring a circle. 
There are certain things where if you don’t 
get the economics right you are clearly going to get 
the law wrong. 
PROF. FOX:  Mario? 
PROF. MONTI:  It’s impressive to be here 
after so many years.  It’s so many but it’s not that 
long.  In the year 2000 we didn’t have any beginning 
of the International Competition Network (ICN) yet; we 
just commented on the statements of Joel Klein one 
week before about the possibility of some multilateral 
initiative.  We didn’t have in Europe a distributed 
system like the European Competition Network (ECN) 
now. 
Maybe the family of competition should slow 
down its recent progress because it is too difficult 
to follow. 
PROF. FOX:  Thank you all.  We’ll think 
seriously about the 3.0 effect and populism in 
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general.  I’m sure we’ll have many more conversations. 
Join with me to thank the panelists. 
MR. KEYTE:  Good job.  Thank you very much. 
I’ll make the one observation that if you 
actually read Article 102, it has the word “fairness” 
in it still. 
PROF. FOX:  Yes. 
MR. KEYTE:  So maybe they need to do 
something there.  But I think the common-law tradition 
in the United States might require some statutory 
changes for these very important objectives. 
Let’s come back in a little over an hour, an 
hour and ten minutes or so, and we’ll have a panel on 
“Vertical Restraints — Convergence or Divergence?” — 
just an incredible panel, and highly, highly topical. 
Thank you so much. 
[Adjourned:  12:40 p.m.] 
